This paper uses novel data to examine the fleets of corporate jets operated by both publicly traded and privately held firms. In the cross-section, firms owned by private equity funds average 40% smaller fleets than observably similar public firms. Similar fleet reductions are observed within firms that undergo leveraged buyouts. Quantile regressions indicate that these results are driven by firms in the upper 30% of the conditional jet distribution. The results thus suggest that executives in a substantial minority of public firms enjoy excessive perquisite and compensation packages.
Managers of a firm might sometimes take actions to benefit themselves at the expense of the firm's investors. Both firms and governments have put in place a variety of mechanisms to mitigate this agency problem, and a great deal of research in corporate finance has been devoted to their study. Nonetheless, there remains considerable debate as to whether further action should be taken to protect outside investors from self-interested managers.
Debate over the desirability of reforming executive compensation arrangements is especially active. Some argue that executives exert too much control over their own compensation and often choose to pay themselves excessively (Yermack (1997) , Bebchuk and Fried (2006) , Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2011) ), while others argue that observed compensation arrangements could represent optimal contracts negotiated at arm's length between firms and valuable executive talent (Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) , Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) , Gayle and Miller (2009) , Kaplan and Rauh (2010) ). Given this mixed evidence, it is not surprising that controversy has surrounded recent attempts by policymakers to mandate more shareholder influence over compensation and other corporate affairs through initiatives like "say-on-pay" and proxy access. This paper brings new evidence to these debates by measuring a particular kind of firm behavior where there is potential for managerial abuse-the use of corporate jets. Executives in many firms travel on jets or other aircraft that are owned or leased by their employers.
Much of this activity is likely perfectly consistent with the maximization of shareholder value. For example, private jets might save many hours of executives' valuable time, and they might serve as an efficient form of compensation. It is also possible, however, that executives could overconsume corporate jets if shareholders are unable to monitor or incentivize them properly. Jet use itself can be costly-annual operating costs can be as high as $5 million per jet, with $1 million being quite typical-but these amounts are not especially large when compared to revenues or profits earned by the firms studied in this paper. The most important reason to study jet fleets is that any observable waste could represent the tip of a larger iceberg of excessive compensation and other agency costs.
I attempt to distinguish between excessive and efficient use of corporate jets by comparing jet fleets in publicly traded firms with those in firms owned and controlled by private equity (PE) funds. PE funds typically buy controlling shares in mature firms through leveraged buyouts (LBOs), impose changes in firm operations or incentives, and eventually sell their shares to other firms or to public shareholders after some period, often several years or more.
1 Three components have been identified as key to PE funds' approach to managing firms: highly levered financing, highly performance-sensitive managerial compensation, and active monitoring of firm activities by skilled professionals from the PE fund. These changes are intended to transform firms into better-managed, more efficient organizations.
A great deal of evidence suggests that PE ownership succeeds in improving efficiency in portfolio companies. Indeed, evidence for improvements in firm performance following LBOs has been found using a variety of dependent variables, in a variety of countries, in each of the last three decades. In a seminal paper, Kaplan (1989) finds large increases in operating performance and market value following 76 U.S. LBOs between 1980 and 1986 . Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990 find substantial increases in total factor productivity (TFP) in a sample of manufacturing plants owned by firms that went through LBOs between 1983 and 1986 . Harris, Siegel, and Wright (2005 find similar results on TFP in a sample of U.K. buyouts between 1994 and 1998. Bergstrom, Grubb, and Johnsson (2007) find a significant positive impact on operating performance in a sample of Swedish buyouts, and Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009) find similar results for French buyouts. Sheen (2009) finds that private U.S.
chemical producers made better-timed investments in new capacity than did publicly traded producers. Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2011) even find that firms register more economically important patents after LBOs. In a sample of recent U.S. buyouts, Guo,Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) find smaller improvements in operating performance than seen in earlier decades, but still conclude that these improvements drive a meaningful component of realized returns to PE funds.
In surveying the literature, Acharya, Hahn, and Kehoe (2009) find that it "suggests that buyouts do create value through operating improvements, in both U.S. and U.K. markets, during both the recent and the 1980s buyout booms." Similarly, Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) find the literature "largely consistent with a view that private equity portfolio companies create economic value by operating more efficiently." I thus interpret jet fleets observed in PE portfolio companies as a benchmark of efficiency against which to compare the fleets of public firms. That is, if public firms have larger fleets than PE-owned firms, I interpret this as evidence of excessive jet use in public firms.
Of course, it is possible that some readers will be unconvinced by this literature documenting performance improvements after LBOs or otherwise reluctant to entertain the notion that one could learn about efficient jet use by studying fleets in PE-owned firms. These readers might prefer to interpret the paper's results in other ways. For example, one could view differences in jet fleets between publicy traded and PE-owned firms as an intriguing fact about behavioral differences across forms of ownership that is still in need of explanation. Or, one could view the results as concrete evidence of LBO-induced cost-cutting, the existence of which has long been assumed but rarely documented.
In any case, it is not often possible to observe behavior in privately held firms, simply because they are not required to produce publicly available information. This shortage of data provides another key motivation for this paper's focus on corporate jets. There are private data vendors who collect information on all business jets-whether their owners are publicly or privately held-primarily for use by other firms in marketing goods and services to jet users. These data provide an unusual opportunity to compare behavior in public and private firms.
Results from the 2008 cross-section indicate that firms owned by private equity funds average about 40% smaller jet fleets than observably similar public firms. In a sample of LBOs occurring between 1992 and 2007, similar fleet reductions occur within firms after their buyouts. As the selection of firms into PE ownership is not random, I discuss assumptions under which these comparisons across and within firms provide estimates of lower and upper bounds on the average treatment effect of taking a firm from public to private in an LBO.
Finally, both traditional and censored quantile regressions indicate that these results at the mean are driven by firms in the upper 30% of the conditional jet distribution. That is, even after controlling for observable characteristics like firm size, there is little difference between public and PE-owned firms at the 60th percentile of the jet distribution or below. Differences emerge, however, at the 70th percentile and above. Overall, results thus suggest that the kind of agency problems that manifest themselves in large jet fleets are far from ubiquitous in public firms. At the same time, however, they are not limited to a very small number of bad apples.
Section I of the paper presents a simple model of selection into PE ownership. Section II describes the data on firms and jet fleets. Section III presents results, and Section IV concludes. An Internet Appendix available on the Journal of Finance website at http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp also provides a variety of alternative specifications, robustness tests, and other supporting material.
I. Model of Selection into Private Equity Ownership
The selection of firms into PE ownership is unlikely to be random, and I have no source of exogenous variation in ownership to exploit in this paper. Here, I present a simple model to clarify the equilibrium relationship between jets and ownership that we would expect when these can both be determined endogenously. I use this simple reasoning about which firms are likely to become PE-owned to argue that cross-section and panel data can be used to estimate useful bounds on the average causal effect of PE ownership.
Denote firm i's profits by Π i . The manager can divert a fraction λ
P U i
to himself in the form of excessive corporate jet use if the firm is public, and λ
P E i
if the firm is PE-owned.
There is a cost c of being a private firm.
2 Firm i can maximize its value by being public if
That is, a firm will optimally be public if the cost (λ
) of managerial diversion of profits is lower than the cost c of being private.
In assessing the need for costly public policies or shareholder actions that could lower λ P U for all firms, we are arguably most interested in estimating the quantity E i [λ
, that is, the average difference across all firms in the fraction of profits inappropriately diverted to jet use when the firm is public instead of PE-owned. Note that consideration of this quantity requires that we imagine counterfactual quantities such as the fraction of profits that would be diverted if a firm were public when the firm is actually PE-owned. This is a hallmark of the heterogeneous treatment effects framework developed by Rubin (1974) and extended by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) .
If we were to estimate the difference in the averages of the fraction of profits diverted in public and private firms in cross-sectional data, we would instead be measuring
That is, we would observe profits diverted in public firms that optimally choose to be public relative to profits diverted in firms that optimally choose to be PE-owned. Suppose, however, that λ P E i = 0 for all i, that is, any jet use observed in PE-owned firms does not represent managerial waste but is instead consistent with maximization of the value of the firm's profits. Further, there is no firm in which PE ownership could not reduce jet use to this efficient level. Note that to argue that this statement is false would be to argue that there are some public firms with self-dealing managers who are so entrenched that even PE ownership could not change their behavior. That there are some public firms with substantial agency problems is, of course, the conclusion of this paper. In this case, we have
Thus, the difference between public and private firms observable in the cross-section would give us a lower bound on the average effect across all firms of taking them from public to private.
We might also be able to observe firms that optimally change from public to private, in which case we could observe the average λ P U i among some set of firms for which it is optimal to be PE-owned. In this simple static setting, I leave unmodeled the dynamic process through which such firms might come to find themselves in a suboptimal state. Because
, the change observed in firms that switch from public to private should give us an upper bound on the average across all firms in the potential change when taking them from public to private. Thus, the cross-sectional difference between public and PE-owned firms and the within-firm changes among firms that switch from public to private should give us lower and upper bounds on the average treatment effect.
The intuition is simple. We might expect firms to go private when they have the most to gain from doing so. When gains from going private include cost savings from reductions in jet use, then PE-owned firms-if they were instead public-would be the firms with the largest jet fleets. Thus, we might expect to underestimate the average effect of being PE-owned when looking in the cross-section, and to overestimate this effect when looking at changes in the panel of leveraged buyouts. There is some evidence for this selection into PE-ownerhsip, but estimates from the cross-section and the panel of LBOs will be fairly similar, suggesting that treatment effects do not differ very much between PE targets and other firms. am not aware of any studies that have used data like these to study business jets.
II. Data
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JETNET data on jet transactions begin in 1989, which unfortunately precludes the study of the many buyouts occuring in the 1980s. A close reading of "Barbarians at the Gate,"
however, allows one to loosely piece together a history of the "RJR Air Force," the fleet of jets operated by RJR Nabisco, before and after its LBO. According to the book, RJR's eighth jet arrived two months after the buyout had been negotiated, due to a delivery lag.
But within a few months of appointing a new CEO, seven out of eight jets had been sold (Burrough and Helyar (1990) , p. 511).
The JETNET data include information on jets that are owned outright, jets that are on capital or operating leases, and jets owned through fractional ownership programs like
NetJets. 6 The data include all jets marketed as business aircraft (like Gulfstreams and Learjets), as well as "executive airliners," or commercial aircraft fitted for business use.
Although the data include some turbo-prop and piston engine planes, I refer to all aircraft as "jets" throughout the paper.
The data include specification information for most jets and estimated operating cost information for some. As the passenger seat capacity field is most frequently populated, I
focus on total seat capacity as a measure of firm-level fleet size. Firms owning a fractional share are counted as a jet operator in results below, and are counted as owning the appropriate percentage of the jet's seats. For example, a firm owning one-eighth of a jet that seats eight is counted as having one seat. There is little difference between public and PE-owned firms in their propensity to own fractional shares, conditional on having any jet.
One might be concerned that jets operated by PE portfolio companies could appear in the data under their PE parents. I looked up the jet fleets of several major PE funds like KKR, Blackstone, Bain Capital, and Carlyle, and at most they operate two or three jets each. As these large funds may have dozens of portfolio companies around the world, any access the companies have to the PE funds' jets must be limited.
One might still be concerned that LBOs could cause some other change in the status [ FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE. ]
To provide a high-level description of the JETNET data, Figure 1 plots the total number of jets that have ever appeared in the data by the year in which they were first delivered.
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There is a notable surge in the number of jets and total seats delivered in the late 1970s, followed by collapse in the early 1980s and a persistent lull through the mid-1990s. This pattern is consistent with the narrative histories of the general aviation aircraft industry provided by Pattillo (1998) and Bednarek and Bednarek (2003) . These authors blame the 1980s collapse on liability lawsuits waged against manufacturers, less favorable tax treatment for business aircraft, airline deregulation that facilitated more commercial flights to remote they average a smaller fleet. Overall, they average a lower ratio of jet seats to firm sales.
The median number of jets in all samples is zero, however, so differences at the mean are driven by the upper parts of the jet fleet distribution. Note that there is not much difference between public and PE-owned firms in the number of commercial flights departing from airports near their headquarters. It is true, however, that public firms are much larger on average than PE-owned firms in the cross-section. The results that follow control for this size difference in a variety of flexible ways. Note that in the panel of LBOs, there is actually relatively little change in firm size from one year before to one year after LBO.
[ Some readers might also like to compare the pre-buyout characteristics of the LBO firms with other public firms that did not go private. 8 In the Internet Appendix, I compare this paper's sample of LBO firms in the two years prior to their LBOs to other public firms, controlling for size, industry, and year. Most notably, and consistent with the existing literature, the firms that became LBO targets had significantly lower market valuations as measured by average Q. There is also some evidence that the LBO firms underperformed when measured by their ratio of sales to assets, but little evidence of much difference between the LBO firms and others in return on assets. Interestingly, the total salary paid to the top five executives named in firm proxy statements is at least 5% higher in firms that subsequently did an LBO, after controlling for size, industry, and performance. However, results using the CEO's salary alone are less robust. To summarize, results are somewhat mixed, but overall provide support for the notion that buyout targets underperformed their peers and paid their executives generously in the years before the buyout.
III. Results
A. Public and Private Firms in the Cross-Section
[ FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE. ] can also see that differences between public and PE-owned firms are not driven only by firm size. For example, the PE-owned firms in quintile 4 are less likely to have a jet than the public firms in quintile 3, even though these PE-owned firms are larger.
A.1. Results on the Presence of Any Jet
Regression results in Table II any of these characteristics, the coefficient in column 1 may provide a biased estimate of the causal effect of PE ownership on the presence of a jet. Column 2 adds controls for firm size, location, and industry in the form of logarithms of sales and employees, dummies for headquarters state, and dummies for two-digit NAICS industries. It also includes the logarithm of the number of scheduled flights leaving from airports within 50 miles of headquarters, the key location variable used by Rajan and Wulf (2006) . To address the potential concern that the logarithmic functional form may not correctly capture relevant variation in size and location, columns 3 and 4 allow for more flexibility. Column 3 adds quadratic polynomials in sales, employees, and scheduled flights, and column 4 includes 30 dummy variables for firms in each of the 10 deciles of sales, employees, and scheduled flights.
In all four columns, the coefficient on the dummy for PE ownership indicates that PEowned firms are 10 to 12 percentage points less likely to operate jets, even after controlling for size, location, and industry. Relative to the 40% of public firms that have any jet, PEowned firms are thus at least 25% less likely to have a jet. Columns 5 and 6 repeat the specifications in columns 3 and 4 using dummies for three-digit NAICS industries in place of two-digit industries, and the estimated effect of PE ownership rises a bit. With standard errors clustered by headquarters state, the estimated effects of PE ownership in columns 2 through 6 are statistically different from zero at the 5% level.
A.2. Results on Fleet Size
The second panel of Figure 2 shows the mean number of jet seats in fleets among firms with at least one jet, again broken out by ownership and size quintile. Conditional on having any jets, we see that PE-owned firms have smaller fleets than publicly traded or private non-PE firms within all five size quintiles. The bottom panel of Figure 2 summarizes the data in the top two panels in a single statistic-the mean across firms of the ratio of the number of jet seats in a firm's fleet to its sales in billions of dollars. For both public and PE-owned firms, there is no obvious relationship between sales and the seats-to-sales ratio, suggesting that taking this simple ratio provides a useful way of controlling for size. It is quite clear that PE-owned firms have smaller fleets by this measure than do public or private, non-PE firms. In fact, small, private, non-PE firms stand out as having the largest fleets given their size. Table III presents regression results that quantify this relationship. In column 1, which contains no controls, we see from the estimated constant that publicly traded firms average 1.586 jet seats per billion dollars of sales. Private non-PE firms have much higher ratios, and PE-owned firms considerably lower. 10 Anyone accustomed to working with firm-level data should be aware that regression results using variables in the form of ratios can often be affected by a small number of extreme values. Indeed, inspection of the data reveals that results in column 1 are somewhat skewed by a relatively small number of observations with very large seats-to-sales ratios. Columns 2 through 6 use data where the seats-to-sales ratio is winsorized at the 95th percentile of its distribution.
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[ With this winsorization, column 2 shows that public firms average 1.199 jet seats per billion dollars of sales, while PE-owned firms average 0.485 fewer seats, a difference of 40%.
Columns 3 through 6 contain various controls for location, industry, and size, and the es-timated magnitude of the effect of PE ownership tends to rise in these specifications. The effect of PE ownership is statistically different from zero at the 10% level in all columns 2 through 6 and at the 1% level in columns 3 and 5.
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Note that Table III also shows that private, non-PE-owned firms average larger fleets than publicly traded firms. This result is helpful in ruling out a class of alternative explanations for the results on PE-owned firms. One might suggest various aspects of publicly traded status that could require additional jet use. For example, perhaps executives in public firms must spend more time traveling to meet with outside shareholders who are spread around the country. Or perhaps regulations require public companies to have large boards of directors that meet frequently. Stories like these could produce differences in jet fleets between public and PE-owned firms, even in the absence of agency problems. They would also predict, however, that private, non-PE-owned firms would have smaller, PE-like fleets.
Instead, private, non-PE-owned firms have fleets at least as large as public firms. This observation itself might lead some to question my interpretation of results as evidence of agency problems, and I discuss this issue at length in section H of the Internet Appendix.
B. Leveraged Buyouts
Results thus far have shown that PE-owned firms in the 2008 cross-section have smaller jet fleets than do publicly traded or private, non-PE firms. These results are quite insensitive to the choice of dependent variable (dummy for any jet, seats-to-sales ratio, or logarithm of seats), to the model used for estimation (OLS, probit, or Tobit), or to the inclusion of a variety of flexible controls for size, industry, and location.
One could still be concerned, however, that these cross-sectional differences do not represent a causal effect of PE ownership. For example, it is possible that PE funds tend to purchase firms that have more access to commercial air services in a way that is not captured by the state dummies and flexible controls for scheduled flights that I have included in the regressions thus far. The limited amount of information available on private firms also prevents one from controlling for a variety of other firm-level variables that some might wish to include.
This section addresses these concerns by measuring changes in jet fleets within firms that are taken from public to private by a PE fund in a leveraged buyout. These results thus hold constant fundamental firm characteristics like their original location, making results unlikely to be driven by simple omitted variable bias. The model in Section II of the paper also suggested that we might interpret results from these LBOs as a bound on the average treatment effect of PE ownership. I will return to this interpretation at the end of this section.
It should be noted that results in this section come from a relatively small sample of firms. Many of the 101 PE-owned firms in the cross-section came from spinoffs of divisions of public firms or from firms that were already private. Of the 69 large, standalone, publicto-private LBOs in the sample I constructed, 32 had at least one jet in the year before their LBO.
13 Of these 32 firms, 20 reduced the number of seats in their fleet within two years of the buyout, five increased their fleets, and seven made no changes. Thus, the number of firms that reduced their fleets post-LBO is four times the number that increased their fleets.
Of course, standard errors are meant to help assess whether this pattern of changes is likely to have arisen by chance, but it is nonetheless important to keep in mind that estimates are from a small sample.
[ FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE. ]
B.1. Results on the Presence of Any Jet
The top panel of Figure 3 displays the fraction of the firms in the LBO sample with any jet in the years surrounding their LBO events. This fraction rises from around 40% several years before LBO to a peak of 46% in the year immediately preceding LBO. It then falls immediately and dramatically in the year of and years after LBO. Note that this figure simply graphs raw means from the unbalanced panel of firms that underwent LBOs.
The composition of firms in the sample changes from point to point in the figure, and no correction is made for any changes in firm size following the LBO.
[ TABLE IV ABOUT HERE. ] Table IV presents regressions of a dummy indicating whether a firm had any jets in a given year on dummies for the years surrounding the firm's LBO (with the year before the LBO omitted) and relevant control variables. All columns include firm fixed effects to control for changes in sample composition that might complicate interpretation of the raw data in Figure 3 . Column 2 adds year effects. 14 Columns 3 and 5 instead include the "kitchen sink"
of size controls in the form of logarithms and quadratic polynomials in sales and employment. The second column relates the propensity to reduce jet fleets during the buyout to the magnitude of CEO personal aircraft use before the buyout, which was hand-collected from firm proxy statements. Twenty of the firms in the buyout sample reported a positive amount of CEO personal aircraft use in at least one of the two years before the buyout. Column 2 of the table shows that there is a clear relationship between these pre-buyout amounts of personal aircraft use and subsequent fleet reductions. The estimated coefficient indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the pre-buyout ratio of spending on CEO personal jet use to sales was associated with a 16 percentage point increase in the probability of a fleet reduction. As the fraction of firms reducing fleets in the full sample was 29%, this 16
percentage point increase represents a 55% increase in the probability of a fleet reduction.
This estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Column 3 relates the probability of a fleet reduction to the residuals from a regression of the log of pre-LBO CEO salary on controls for size, year, industry, and performance.
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The coefficient indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in pre-buyout residual CEO salary was associated with an 11 percentage point increase in the probability of a post-LBO fleet reduction. This represents a 38% increase from the mean probability of a fleet reduction, and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. Combined with results from columns 1 and 2, the table thus suggests that the fleet reductions observed in LBO firms are indeed correlated with executives who enjoyed especially generous pre-buyout perquisite and compensation packages and were likely to be removed post-LBO.
In columns 4 to 6, however, there is little evidence that post-LBO fleet reductions are related to pre-LBO underperformance as measured by residual Q, ROA, or the ratio of sales to assets. It is possible, of course, that these variables constructed from accounting data are simply noisy measures of performance that can say little in a small sample like this one. For example, it is also true that there is little evidence of any relation between these performance variables and the probability of CEO turnover after the buyout. On the other hand, at face value the results in Table V would suggest that there might simply be little relation between the CEO removal, compensation, and perquisite variables in columns 1 to 3 and the broad firm performance measures in Columns 4 to 6. Indeed, this explanation seems quite plausible considering the weak evidence for any effect of compensation variables on firm performance within samples of public firms found elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, the surveys by Murphy (1999) , Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) , and Frydman and Jenter (2010)).
C. Comparing Cross-Sectional and LBO Results
Returning to the comparison between the cross-sectional and LBO results, it appears that results provide modest support for the hypothesis that firms' selection into PE ownership is positively correlated with their potential reductions in jet use. That is, the effects of PE ownership appear a bit larger in the LBO panel than in the cross-section. Of the 69 public firms that underwent LBOs, 46% began with at least one jet. This figure exceeds the 40% of public firms in the 2008 cross-section that had a jet by 15%, even though the LBO targets are much smaller on average. In the cross-section, PE-owned firms were at least 25% less likely than public firms to have any jet, while my preferred estimate from the LBO panel was 32%. The range of estimates across specifications in both samples is large enough, however, that drawing any firm conclusion from the comparison of these numbers seems unwarranted.
What is quite clear, however, is the substantial average difference between jet fleets in publicly traded and PE-owned firms, both in the cross-section and in the panel of LBOs.
Recalling the model of selection into PE ownership from Section II, one could then interpret the combination of cross-sectional and LBO results in two ways. If one was convinced that omitted variables produce an upward bias in the cross-section, one would regard crosssectional results as providing an upward-biased estimate of a lower bound on the average treatment effect of PE ownership-an estimate that is not very useful. In this case, the LBO results still provide evidence that PE ownership reduces jet fleets in some firms, but relatively little could be said about the average treatment effect.
Alternatively, one might think that the cross-sectional results are unlikely to be badly biased. I favor this second interpretation, as results from the cross-section are quite stable across a wide variety of estimation approaches. For example, estimates change little and often increase in magnitude when more controls are added to a given specification, providing little reason to worry that adding related unobservable variables would have large effects.
One would then note that the estimated fleet reductions associated with PE ownership from the cross-section and from the LBO panel are essentially very similar, and one would conclude that these provide a good estimate of the average treatment effect. In particular, one would conclude that the average effect of PE ownership on jet fleets is a reduction in fleet size of about 40%. That is, if firms that are currently public were randomly selected to be taken private, we should expect average fleet reductions of at least this size.
D. Leverage vs. Monitoring
Thus far, results have not addressed the question of which aspects of PE ownership are most important in changing firm behavior. This section discusses changes in jet fleets within certain samples of public firms that might shed light on this question.
17
To investigate whether increases in leverage alone are enough to drive fleet reductions, I
construct a sample of firms that remained public but went through a large increase in leverage within a single year, as firms do when they go through LBOs. I select all public firms with sales greater than $1 billion in 2008 dollars that increased their ratios of total debt to assets and long-term debt to assets by 20 percentage points or more within one year between 1992 and 2008. To isolate firms that were increasing leverage without undergoing other major changes in characteristics, I exclud firms that either increased or decreased total assets by 10% or more in the same year as the leverage increase. This selection procedure identifies 39 firms that went through a large leverage increase over this period. Many, but not all, of these firms reported that their borrowing was associated with a leveraged recapitalization or similar transaction in their SEC filings or press releases. Note that the magnitude of leverage increases in this sample is comparable to those reported by Denis and Denis (1993) in their study of leveraged recapitalizations from the 1980s. However, they are somewhat smaller than the leverage increases associated with the LBOs studied by Kaplan (1989) or Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song (2011) .
The Internet Appendix presents results from this sample in the same format as those previously presented for leveraged buyouts. The propensity to operate a jet and the ratio of seats to sales do fall a bit by the end of the year of the leverage increase, but this decline is at best narrowly statistically significant and appears within the range of normal fluctuations in this small sample. Indeed, the decline is fully reversed in subsequent years. To summarize, there is little evidence of any systematic change in jet fleets following these large leverage increases in public firms.
To investigate the alternative hypothesis that changes in control and monitoring drive the fleet reductions seen during LBOs, I also measure the propensities of public firms that went through mergers to retain the jets that they operated in the year before the merger. Using data from CRSP and Compustat, I select a sample of all mergers between two standalone U.S. public firms from 1992 to present, where both the target and the acquirer had sales greater than $1 billion in 2008 dollars in the year before the merger. There were 213 mergers that met all criteria. I then identify all jets operated by either the target or the acquiring firm in the year before the merger and track whether those jets were still listed under the names of the target, the acquirer, or the new combined entity in the years following the merger.
[ FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE. ] Figure 4 presents the results of this exercise. The probability of retaining a jet operated by the acquiring firm before the merger declines in years after the merger, likely due to normal turnover in jet fleets and possible economies of scale in the number of jets required by the new entity. But, more importantly, the probability that the target's jets are retained is much lower. From one to four years after the merger, the targets' jets are about 20 percentage points less likely to be retained than the jets of the acquiring firm. Regression results measuring this effect and more discussion of the data appear in Section F of the Internet Appendix. The difference between the probability of retaining jets from the target and acquiring firms is highly statistically significant in all specifications.
Of course, the jet needs of a merger target may be different from those of a standalone firm that goes private in an LBO. In particular, if economies of scale are realized when the acquisition target is absorbed into the operations of the acquirer, it may be quite natural for some jets to be sold, even in the absence of any agency problems. Nonetheless, the discrepancy between the treatment of the target and acquirer jets is quite suggestive. When public ownwership in the target firms is replaced with a single blockholder-the acquirerthere is a clear reduction in the propensity to retain the firms' jets. When contrasted with the results on leverage above, this fact may suggest that changes in control and monitoring during LBOs are key to subsequent fleet reductions.
E. Quantiles
The previous sections show that PE-owned firms have smaller jet fleets, on average, than publicly traded or private, non-PE firms, both across and within firms. This section describes the distribution of jet fleets in more detail to better understand these differences at the mean.
In fact, one might already suspect that average differences are driven by the top part of the jet distribution. The descriptive statistics in Table I show that more than 60% of firms in the cross-sectional sample have no jet visible in the data, and the results in Table III show that estimated average magnitudes are sensitive to winsorization of the largest fleets. Table VI presents quantile regressions that formally test this suspicion. Column 1 indicates that, indeed, there is essentially no difference between the 50th percentiles of the distributions of the ratio of seats to sales in PE-owned and non-PE-owned firms, after controlling for size and location through the quantile regression. The differences at the 60th and 70th percentiles in columns 2 and 3 are well below the mean difference from Table III .
The difference at the 80th percentile is a bit larger than the mean difference, and the difference at the 90th percentile is two times larger still. Thus, the difference in conditional averages between public and PE-owned firms that we saw in Table III does not manifest itself throughout the conditional distribution of jet fleets. Instead, it is driven by firms in the upper part of the fleet distribution. Panel B of Table VI shows that results are robust to correcting for censoring using the algorithm of Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) .
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[ These quantile results are potentially quite important for understanding the nature of the agency problems that this paper measures. Although there is a large average difference in jet fleets between public and PE-owned firms, the quantile results indicate that large fleets are far from ubiquitous in public firms. However, they are also not limited to a very small number of "bad apples." Instead, it seems that a substantial minority-perhaps 20%
to 30%-of public firms have jet fleets that appear excessive by the standards of PE-owned firms.
These results are also helpful in ruling out a class of alternative explanations for the results presented previously. One might suggest various aspects of public or PE ownership itself that would produce differences in jet fleets. For example, perhaps executives in all public firms must spend more time traveling to meet with outside shareholders who are spread across the country. Or perhaps some feature of the PE ownership structure changes a firm's objective function or discount factor in such a way that jets are less attractive investments to PE-owned firms. Stories like this could produce differences in jet fleets between public and PE-owned firms in both cross-sectional and panel data. They would also predict that all public firms would have a modest jet fleet, albeit larger than those in PE-owned firms.
Instead we see that most public firms have no visible jet, but a substantial minority have surprisingly large fleets. 19 Results are thus more consistent with the presence of agency problems in this minority of firms than with any structural difference in jet needs between public and PE-owned firms.
IV. Conclusions
This paper presents evidence showing that firms owned by PE funds average smaller jet fleets than do publicly traded or private, non-PE-owned firms. This difference is not likely to be driven by omitted variables in the cross-section, as there are also clear reductions in fleet size within firms when public firms are taken private in an LBO. Most firms in the sample, however, have no jets visible in the data, and both standard and censored quantile regressions indicate that mean differences between PE-owned and other firms are driven by firms in the top 30% of the conditional jet fleet distribution. I argue that these results are most consistent with the presence of agency problems in a substantial minority of public firms.
I view these results as contributing a somewhat nuanced point to the debate on the severity of agency problems in public firms and the need for further reform of executive compensation. PE ownership produces clear reductions in jet fleets, and there are many public firms whose jet fleets appear large by the standards of PE-owned firms. These results conflict with the strict view that observed executive compensation arrangements in all public firms are the result of optimal contracts negotiated at arm's length. On the other hand, public firms with excessive jet fleets are in the minority. The kind of agency problems that manifest themselves in excessive jet fleets are far from ubiquitous in public firms.
These insights might be important for evaluating the costs and benefits of various proposals to improve corporate governance. For example, imposing costly regulations on all firms might be inappropriate if agency problems are severe only in a minority. More research into appropriate policy responses to heterogeneity in governance problems would be welcome.
Notes
1 In this paper, I adopt the convention of referring to investors that are in the business of buying firms through LBOs as "private equity" investors, as do Kaplan and Stromberg (2009) . Other authors may use the term "private equity" to refer to both these LBO investors as well as to venture capital investors that focus their attention on younger firms.
2 It is easy to show that the results extend to a model in which the cost c of being private can also vary across firms, potentially representing variation in the amount of profits that managers can divert to themselves through non-jet channels when their firm is public.
3 The factors that limit my ability to construct cross-sections from multiple years are the availability of the PE ownership dummy described below and the costly process of cleaning the name merge of firm and jet data. I thus focus on carefully constructing one cross-sectional sample and one sample of firms that went from public to PE-owned. 4 The jet data were merged by firm name onto both the cross-sectional and buyout samples of firms. More details on this procedure are available in the Internet Appendix.
5 Rajan and Wulf (2006) use data from a survey of 300 publicly traded firms, and Yermack (2006) uses data from public firm proxy statements.
6 The data do not, of course, include any information on other forms of transportation used by firms that do not own or lease a jet. For example, they do not include information on jets that might be chartered for individual trips. The jet chartering industry has reportedly grown rapidly in the years since the September 11 terrorist attacks made commercial air travel more difficult. It may well be the case that many firms in the data substitute chartered jets for jets that they operate themselves, presumably because they find it cheaper or more efficient to do so.
7 The JETNET data take the form of a transactions file that lists jet transactions beginning in 1989 and a current cross-sectional file of registered jets. Jets that were delivered before 1989, that were never involved in a transaction after 1989, and that are not currently registered to fly anywhere in the world are likely absent from the JETNET data. Thus, the pre-1989 data plotted in Figure 1 likely undercount the total number of jets delivered in each year, with the bias being more substantial earlier in the sample. However, inspection of the gaps in the sequences of jet serial numbers appearing in the data suggest that the undercount is not too severe for the period shown in the figure, beginning in 1965.
8 A number of other papers perform comparisons like this using various samples of LBOs-some notable examples include Maupin, Bidwell, and Ortegren (1984) , Lehn and Poulsen (1989) , Opler and Titman (1993) , Servaes (1994) , Halpern, Kieschnick, and Rotenberg (1999), Weir, Laing, and , and Stuart and Yim (2010) .
9 To be clear, quintile 5 includes the largest firms, regardless of their ownership. The bars then display averages by ownership group within this size group.
10 I focus on the ratio of seats to sales to avoid making arbitrary assumptions about the many firms with zero jets, but one might also think it natural to use the logarithm of jet seats as a dependent variable. In the Internet Appendix, I present regressions like this, replacing all zero-jet observations with the logarithm of the smallest nonzero observation. As this method overestimates fleets in zero-jet firms, and PE-owned firms are more likely to have zero jets, it should attenuate the estimated effect of PE ownership. Nonetheless, estimates of the effect of PE ownership on the logarithm of seats range from -0.42 to -0.56, and all are statistically different from zero at the 5% or 1% level.
Due to the many firms in this sample with zero visible jets, some economists might also argue that one should use estimators like the Tobit that account for censoring in the dependent variable. Section C of the Internet Appendix presents Tobit results. Results are quite robust to using the logarithm as the dependent variable or using the Tobit estimator.
11 That is, observations with values above the 95th percentile are replaced with the value at the 95th percentile. Winsorizing at higher threshholds (like 99%) raises the estimated magnitude of the effect of PE ownership.
12 In this set of results, clustering by headquarters state actually lowers the standard errors on the PE ownership dummy, so the table reports the larger, unclustered standard errors. In all results, the choice of clustering matters most in specifications in which state fixed effects are not included, as one would expect.
13 It is worth noting that the firms with jets prior to their LBO are primarily drawn from the most recent wave of LBOs. Of the 32 firms with jets in the year prior to their LBO, 18 went private in 2007, five in 2006, and three in 2005. One might worry that fleet reductions in these firms were not driven by the LBO, but rather by the oil price spike, financial crisis, and recession of 2008 and 2009. However, the cross-sectional difference between public and PE firms documented in the previous section suggests that these factors are not driving differences between public and PE-owned firms, because the public firms in the cross-section could also have reduced their fleets. Further, because jets are long-lived, the stock of jets is relatively inelastic. 14 To avoid colinearity with the firm dummies and time variables, the year effects are normalized to sum to zero and to be orthogonal to a time trend using the transformation described by Deaton (1997) . With this normalization, the estimated year effects measure any cyclical changes in the probability of having a jet. Any trend could then appear in the firm fixed effects or the LBO dummies.
15 In the Internet Appendix, I present similar results with the seats-to-sales ratio as the dependent variable. Although there is considerable variation across specifications, preferred results indicate a post-LBO fleet size reduction of about 43%. Section E of the Internet Appendix also discusses results from a small sample of firms that went from PE-owned to public in an IPO. Results are consistent with fleets growing again after IPO, but standard errors are too large to draw firm conclusions.
16 This regression is presented in the Internet Appendix. Results are quite similar using the residuals from regressions with total salary paid to the top five executives as the dependent variable.
17 I thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this line of inquiry.
18 Section G of the Internet Appendix provides a graphical depiction of these quantile results, and it motivates and discusses the Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) results.
19 Recall also that Rajan and Wulf (2006) and Yermack (2006) find little relation between jet use and ownership variables within the cross-section of public firms. Table I Descriptive Statistics This table presents The dependent variable in all columns is the ratio of the total seat capacity of a firm's aircraft fleet to its sales in billions of 2008 dollars. The sample includes U.S. firms with 2008 sales greater than $1 billion.
Other variables are described in Table I . Columns 2 through 6 winsorize the dependent variable at the 95th percentile. OLS standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors fall if clustered by headquarters state or industry. The symbol *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
(1) 
Regressions of a Dummy for Fleet Reduction on Pre-LBO Firm Characteristics
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a firm in the sample of 69 LBOs used in the paper reduced its jet fleet within two years of the LBO. The independent variable in the first column is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm changed its CEO between one year before and one year after the LBO. The independent variables in columns 2 to 6 are all winsorized at the 5% and 95% levels and normalized by their standard deviation, so that the coefficients indicate the impact of a one-standard deviation increase.
In column 2 the independent variable is the ratio of a firm's reported spending on personal jet use for its CEO to sales in the year before the LBO. In columns 3 to 6, the dependent variables are residuals from regressions presented in the Internet Appendix. The symbol *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
(1) The dependent variable in all columns is the ratio of the total seat capacity of a firm's aircraft fleet to its sales in billions of dollars. The column headers indicate the quantile of the conditional seats-to-sales distribution at which effects are estimated. Estimates in all columns include controls for logarithms and quadratic polynomials in sales, employees, and flights within 50 miles, but coefficients are not reported. The censored quantile estimates in Panel B are computed using the algorithm of Chernozhukov and Hong (2002) as described in the Internet Appendix. The number of observations reported for these estimates refers to the number of observations used in the quantile regression in the final step of the estimation. Standard errors are calculated using the block bootstrap, with headquarters state as the block variable. Thus, standard errors are robust to error correlation within states. The symbol *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Figure 1 . Total jets and total seats by year of initial delivery for universe of jets in JETNET data. This figure displays aggregate time-series data on the total number of jets and total seats delivered by year of delivery for the universe of jets that ever appear in the JETNET data. . Retention of jets operated by public firms involved in mergers. The figure plots the probability that a jet operated by a target or acquiring firm in the year before a merger of two public firms is operated by the same firm in the years prior to merger or by the new, combined entity in years following the merger. This probability is equal to one by construction in the year before the merger, as this is how the sample of jets is chosen.
